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RECENT CASE NOTES
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-QUESTION OF FACT FOR JURY-BASIS FOR
CONCLUSION OF JuRY-Appeal from verdict of jury and judgment for de-
fendant below for damages for injury to wife of appellant, appellant, and
car of appellant. Accident occurred on a paved street, widely used for
travel, on a dark, misty night, at a time when street was slippery. Appel-
lee's truck was parked near the curb, without lights. Appellant dimmed
his lights for an approaching car and left them dimmed after he passed it,
some fifty feet from appellee's truck. Appellant's car struck appellee's
truck and was thrown eighty feet down the road on its side, and was prac-
tically demolished. Held: There was a basis for conclusion of jury of con-
tributory negligence on part of appellant. McKee v. Suez, Appellate Court
of Indiana, September 12, 1929, 167 N. E. 720.
The only question presented by assigned error of overruling of appel-
lant's motion for new trial was whether there was a basis for conclusion of
jury that appellant was guilty of contributory negligence.
Where contributory negligence is the proximate cause of the injury,
plaintiff's remedy is barred. Kingan & Co. v. Cleason, 101 N. E. 1027;
Nave v. Flack, 26 Ind. 443; Hathaway v. Toledo, Wabash and Western Rd.,
46 Ind. 25. The essential elements necessary to make available the defense
of contributory negligence are: (1) want of ordinary care by plaintiff and
(2) a causal relation between that want of care and the injury. Salem-
Bedford Stone Co. -. O'Brien, 12 Ind. App. 217. What is or is not ordi-
nary care depends on the circumstances. Indianapolis St. Ry. v. Schmidt,
71 N. E. 663. Ordinary care should be that degree of care and foresight
which a reasonable and prudent man would or ought to use under the cir-
cumstances. (For an extreme case as respects contributory negligence, see
Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Bennet, 35 N. E. 1033, where a pedestrian
undertaking to cross a track running on a city street, when he sees a train
approaching at 930 feet, was held to be negligent.) The converse in facts
of the principal case is presented in Collins v. McMullins, 225 Ill. 430, where
plaintiff left car parked without lights and defendant drove into it at night.
It was there held that plaintiff could not recover, due to his contributory
negligence in leaving car parked without lights. The result in both cases
is the same, that where both are negligent and negligence of both is proxi-
mate cause of the injury, neither can recover for his injuries.
In the principal case there was a basis for the jury's conclusion of con-
tributory negligence on the part of appellant. Such force, as was neces-
sary to throw appellant's car eighty feet and wreck it so completely, could
result only from excessive speed. Under existing circumstances, high speed
and running with lights dimmed when it was not necessary, does not show
exercise of ordinary care, and has a causal relation to injuries com-
plained of. H. N. F.
INSURANCE-WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE--CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY-PROXI-
MATE CAUS--Plaintiff sued on a policy of accident insurance for the death
of her husband. The policy covered death resulting "directly and inde-
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